Self Reliance in Defence Manufacturing: The Indian Example, Some Reflections

                

For several experts in the field of National Defence and Security, ‘Make in India’  has been more than just a mere slogan, and an amalgamation of all the ongoing projects,  procurements and forward planning in India’s security sector. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his bid to transform the otherwise lackadaisical approach of India’s Defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Defence Research and Development Organisations (DRDOs) as well as Private Companies envisioned a progressive approach strongly backed by a strategy built on the ethos of credibility and immediate deliverables, job creation, thus adding strength to India’s indigenous defence industry under his mission “Make in India”.

Some Reflections: Marred by project delays and issues of Request for Information (RFI), Request for Proposals (RFP) and Transfer of Technology (ToT), licensing issues with Russia, United States, India’s defence sector is currently undergoing massive transformation, a natural corollary to Modi’s frequent visits to other countries and subsequent discussions with his counterparts on defence and security. The revised Defence Procurement Policy is also being projected as the game changer. However financial, political and strategic investments in projects meant to modernise India’s defence industry exhibit a very uneven path. Whether it is the MMRCA, Tejas or AWACS statistics reveal that India is yet to achieve a great breakthrough in defence, compared to China or Pakistan as in the case of AWACS.

The Cabinet Committee on Security has time and again sanctioned several projects, but uneven investments have often defeated the very purpose of rapid military transformations, to tackle new asymmetrical threats.  If statistics provided by the defence ministry are to be believed, India has signed five deals of more than Rs 2,500 crore since May 2014. This includes the Tactical Communication Systems (TCS), Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) (worth $ 7.5 billion) for the Indian Army, construction of seven Shivalik class frigates (Project 17 A) for the Navy, by Mazagon Docs Limited and Garden Reach Steel Industry, amounting to Rs 45201 crores. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is currently in the process of building basic trainer aircraft HTT 40 and Sukhoi MK 1 aircraft in line with the 272 target set for 2018 by the Indian Air Force. There are several such deals being planned. But deadlock over Rafale continues to make headlines. Meanwhile, reacting to the commercial deadlock over Rafale prices with Dassault, other players such as Lockheed Martin (F 16), Saab (Gripen) are now streamlining their business strategy, to meet the requirements of the Indian industry under Make in India. Saab is willing to partner with Indian companies, giving India complete software control to build the Gripen fighter in India. Saab is also keen on setting up an aeronautic training academy in India.

For a strong indigenous defence industry both outside support and internal political commitments are very crucial. Integral to any development program, is the need to provide a conducive socio-economic and political environment where any proposed idea can take roots. The liberalisation of the FDI Policy in Defence, which shifted the fulcrum of indigenisation from ‘state of the art technology’ to ‘modern technology’ was indeed a welcome change. The buzz word, Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured' (IDDM) now stands at 30:70, (Imports 30%) focus remaining on indigenisation. The FDI policy was revised to fill critical gaps in technology aiding job creation and growth if Indian industry. Despite the very obvious reports on project delays, falling production targets in the case of the Ordnance Factories, and sudden inflow of private players such as Reliance and Mahindra for example in the defence arena, ‘Make in India’ is a progressive move aimed to strengthen India’s defence industry.

However, there is no systematic explanation for India’s dialogues with Russia and the US over defence procurements and projects. The very crucial aspect of Transfer of Technology (ToT) especially nuclear propulsion (for example, in the case of nuclear supercarrier) has often caused unnecessary delays in signing of agreements between Original Equipment Makers (OEM’s) and India. Offset policy (2012) allows Joint ventures through the non-equity route. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar recently stated that the real impact of Make in India will be seen in 2017. Parrikar stressed on the need to outsource certain products in order to maintain a healthy production chain. So the question remains: Can private players deliver better? Is the budget enough to meet the requirements of Make in India? Will the dynamics of a Russia- US power play (add China for good measure), affect India’s position as a strong defence power in South Asia and subsequently on the global stage? It was in 2001 when private players first entered the defence domain, with a 26% FDI bid. But terms and conditions laid out by the government were so stringent, that deliverables were far from being met. Technical education lagged behind affecting human resource availability.

One very important aspect of defence modernization is the ongoing Research and Development (R&D) in the field of security that has been crafted to meet the requirements of the modern day battlefield. Advancement in information technology and the changing nature of threats, whether man-made or accidental, on land, sea, air and even the virtual space now coerces one to assess the outcomes of  procurements, acquisitions and mergers, in defence manufacturing sector.

The pace with which technology is becoming obsolete is a real problem. Defence preparedness calls not just for military modernisation but also reforms, which are capable of accelerating the R& D processes in the field of security. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that no one player or OEM can fully manufacture critical equipment. Several components are now procured from various producers, making the procurement procedure lengthy and complicated. These can cause unnecessary delays too.  Another point of view currently attracting a lot of attention is that opening the doors of the security sector to foreign players will jeopardise India’s position as a strong defence power.

That foreign players are still not fully convinced with the idea of ‘Make in India’ especially shifting their production bases to India, a market which has inherent haphazard supply chain structures, is a different question altogether. Lastly, more than flooding the market with success stories, the focus should be on the needs of the defence forces and on the operational efficacy of equipment manufactured under Make in India. Positive market trends have indeed widened the horizons of defence manufacturing in India but India still needs a little more political and financial push to achieve a higher degree of self-reliance in defence technology.

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Women Combatants: The Gender Narrative

In quick succession over the past few weeks, the political leadership in some major countries have indicated their commitment to bringing women in frontline combat roles in their armies. There have been statements to this effect by the US, the UK, and India. These have evinced in turn a slew of articles debating how women would affect operational efficacy and efficiency. For the record, about three dozen countries around the world have women in their armed forces, though not necessarily in combat roles. The roles assigned to women differ from country to country, with some having passed legislation for equal rights and therefore equal roles within the armed forces, Norway and Sweden being in the forefront; while others have steadfastly held back from assigning combat duties to their women intake, notable amongst these being France and Turkey. By virtue of its acute requirement for defence forces right from its inception, Israel has always had women employed in combat duties, and has legislated equality of women in any role in the IDF to that of men. The form of recruitment varies from the voluntary to conscription in all these countries. Similarly, they have each charted their own course for the training requirements, physical standards, mandatory term of service, roles and duties assigned to women, and inevitably the laws on sexual harassment. Given the wide spectrum of issues which likely affect and govern the intake of women in armed forces, a logical debate arises about the recent declarations by the US, UK and India. Have certain realities been overlooked? What is it that compels these leaders- is it simply a race for gender equality while disregarding facts based on reality? This analysis seeks to examine both sides of the argument to decide what the right course of action should be.

Firstly, the Israeli example. As said earlier, certain issues emanating from the its very inception required each and every able bodied individual to take up arms; this in effect made it possible for women being assigned frontline combat roles. There was simply no debate, it was the need of the hour. Throughout the history of Israel as an independent nation, virtually the same set of circumstances have pushed it in to decisions based on need. Simultaneously, its armed forces served as a giant cauldron for the rapid amalgamation of its huge and varied immigrant population. These factors made it imperative first, then simpler to continue (later) with women serving in combat roles. Yet, despite its 2000 Equality amendment to Military Service Law, only one woman serves as a Major General and sections of the establishment feel that the glass ceiling may still take some time to crumble. This notwithstanding, Israel has undergone decades of strife on its borders, giving valuable insights in to problems which women may face; it is to its credit that the country seems to have dealt with most of them successfully.

Any army seeking to bring women in to combat must also realistically examine certain other issues. Primarily these deal with the biological differences (with men), followed by psychological differences and concerns related to the likely enemy they face and tactical situations arising from it. Physically women are smaller than men, have less strength, endurance and the ability to bear punishment that the body has to face in combat regimen. They are also more prone to muscoskeletal injuries, more so after pregnancy. These factors obviously make them more prone to injury such as stress fractures, and they may not be able to endure heavy weights such as carrying a wounded comrade with his equipment over long distances. Even during training women have had to be given reduced loads to maintain the momentum of training; lower physical standards in training would result in reduced fitness for basic combat tasks. At the end of the day, it has to be remembered that 'gear carried is gear required'. In aerial combat, it has been scientifically ascertained that the ability to withstand high gravitational forces that fighter pilots have to endure regularly, is reduced substantially in the female body. Certain armed forces have maintained the same physical standards for women as are expected from men because of these realities of combat, but at the cost of lower numbers at the recruitment stage, and increasing number of dropouts at subsequent stages.

Chief amongst the psychological reasons is the purported awkwardness or the inability associated with men taking orders from women seniors or officers. However, what is definitely worse is the debilitating effect on unit and individual morale that the sight of a wounded woman comrade would have. Most societies follow their own form of patriarchy, and deep rooted prejudices may be difficult to erase completely. Even if education and awareness were to bury these, the second factor of being witness to a wounded woman has been seen to arouse very strong protective instincts. While this may be an honourable thing in civilian life, it degrades the morale of the unit, lowers the robot like proficiency of the individual soldier and ultimately results in lower efficacy in combat. Evidence of this exists historically in the 1948 operations in Israel. Many anecdotal examples abound, where senior and experienced officers and NCOs have expressed their consternation at the decision to allow women in combat units.

While squeamishness on the part of women on seeing blood and gore in combat operations may be possible, suitable psychological training may help to reduce the shock effect associated with injuries and death. Another area of concern is the possibility of capture, torture and sexual assault by the enemy. This has been in fact expressed by women soldiers themselves. Feminism and gender equality may sound exalted as theories, but they cannot change biological realities. Also, given the degree of barbarianism shown by what these women would face, namely ISIS fighters, or other terror oriented groups of that genre, capture would almost certainly result in torture, decapitation and rape, probably on live media. Is any army ready to accept these costs? More importantly, is any political establishment ready to accept the cost?

The decision to announce the entry of women into combat roles is definitely politically motivated, aimed at achieving political correctness which seems to be in sync with the rhetoric on equality of sexes. However, this decision needs to be tempered with practicality and pragmatism. In their bid to achieve political correctness, governments may well end up making the biggest politically incorrect decision. It would take only one media recording of physical assault on a woman combatant to bring this house of cards down. What it will end up doing to the combat effectiveness of the armed forces is another story altogether.

Pic Courtesy: National Geographic