The full online version of this paper can be accessed at:
http://www.ijrssh.com/images/short_pdf/1499763417_Amitabh_1.pdf
ABSTRACT
The
Armed Forces Special Powers Act continues to be used by the Indian
government in insurgency ridden areas, gaining wide traction in the
debate on conflict and its resolution. Civil society condemns the Act
for issues relating to Human Rights, and the draconian powers it
seemingly bestows on the armed forces. This research paper seeks to
examine the debate in the larger context of its legality, its
validity in the current scenario, and the artificial divide it
creates in civil society discourse.
KEYWORDS
Jammu
& Kashmir, Politics, Conflict, Armed Forces, Violence, Analyses,
Civil Society, Human Rights, Special Powers
INTRODUCTION
The
Armed Forces Special Powers Act has been used by the Government of
India in insurgency areas since the 1950s. It has certain provisions
which have been termed ‘draconian’ for their neglect of human
rights and the powers given to the armed forces which can be
interpreted as being against constitutional rights. The Act has
played a major role in the spiralling of the conflict since its
enactment in 1990. It becomes a catalyst for an artificial divide
within civil society. Indian society has a burning issue for debate
and it is all encompassing. Apart from the police and the armed
forces which get dragged in to the debate, AFSPA has the attention of
the sharpest legal minds of the country and the voices of the human
rights groups. Politicians of all hues partake in the debate and
contribute according to their political flavour of the day. There is
little doubt that armed forces need some form of protection in
insurgency operations; however prolonged or even indefinite
employment of the act serves to create the impression that it is
meant to cover up human rights violations. The Supreme Court has
upheld the validity of the Act, but has also given out some very
relevant guidelines in this regardi.
This section analyses the provisions of the Act, as well as what
causes the debate. In doing so, the factual data has been ascertained
from the texts of various documents in public domain. The debate is
substantiated by the certain incidents which have caused the rising
crescendo for the revocation of the Act. The paper is concluded by
looking at what aspects of the current debate are not fully
understood and hence need to be focussed upon.
DISTURBED
AREAS AND THE ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT
If
the President or the Governor of a state opine that an area is in
such a disturbed or dangerous state that armed forces of the Union
are required to aid civi authorities, they have the power to declare
the areas as ‘disturbed areas’. The power emanates from two Union
Acts, namely the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958, and the
Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990. Certain
specified categories of officers from the Union armed forces are
allowed to exercise enhanced powers by virtue of being deployed in
such ‘disturbed areas’. The power to declare an area as
‘disturbed area’ has been used by the Indian government in areas
facing insurgency such as the north-eastern states and J&K (Jha
2015: 22)
The
Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) owes its origins to an
ordinance of the same name promulgated by the British in 1942 to
suppress the Quit India movement. After Independence, the Indian
government issued four ordinances to control the widespread communal
rioting and breakdown of law and order post partition. These
ordinances were issued for Bengal, Assam, East Punjab and Delhi, and
the United Provinces. The ordinances were based on the British one of
1942. These four ordinances were replaced by the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act 1947, temporarily for one year, and finally by the Act of
1958 in response to the deteriorating internal security situation in
Assam at the behest of the Naga tribes.
The
British ordinance had sweeping powers provided to officers to enable
them to deal with violence in emergencies, such as powers to arrest
any person who did not respond when challenged or found damaging
property. It also enabled officers to use force including if it
caused death. Finally the officers were afforded immunity from
prosecution save with prior approval of the government. When the same
were sought to be enshrined in the Indian Act of 1958, it was
subjected to intense debate in Parliament. The argument was that such
powers would result in violation of the rights of the people, as also
allow the armed forces to use excessive force even when not required.
However the Act was passed in Parliament (Das 2012). This Act has
been enforced in the north-eastern states since the 1950s, in Punjab
in the 1980s, and in J&K since 1990. The complete text of the
Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1990 has been attached at Appendix 1
to this research.
As
stated above, AFSPA enables the President or the Governor to declare
the area ‘disturbed’ making the use of the armed forces in aid of
civil authority possible. This is supposed to be within a time limit,
with provisions for periodic review every six months. The definition
of the term ‘disturbed area’ has been clarified by the Delhi High
Court, wherein it states “the term ‘disturbed area’ defies any
definition- it has to be adjudged according to the location,
situation and circumstances of a particular case”ii
(Jha 2015).
AFSPA
gives special powers vide its section 4 to commissioned officers,
warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, to fire or use force
against any person causing disturbance in the given area, or carrying
arms, ammunition and explosives. They can also destroy arms dumps,
fortified positions or training camps in use by armed gangs. They can
arrest people committing cognisable offences, or enter and search
premises where arms or ammunition may be stored, without the
requirement of a warrant. While these seem unduly excessive, the
same powers are given to police officers under Criminal Procedure
Code (Cr PC) 1973. It therefore raises the question as to why AFSPA
should be required if the same provisions can be exercised by the
police forces.
In
terms of the provisions in section 5 of AFSPA arrested persons are to
be handed over to the nearest police station at the earliest. This
leads to the question of arbitrariness in deciding ‘least possible
delay’. The arresting authority cannot keep the arrested for
interrogation and has to be satisfied that the person is involved in
the matter before the arrest is made. Armed forces working in such
‘disturbed areas’ are provided protection under section 6 of
AFSPA, and prosecution is possible with the sanction of the Central
government. The government sanction or refusal thereof is subject to
judicial scrutiny. In itself it nullifies any argument on the
immunity afforded to armed forces, since the matter is subject to
judicial review. Also, the same provisions apply to police forces
under section 197 of Cr PC, as well as the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978, amended in 1987 and 1990.
While
questioning the deployment of AFSPA in disturbed areas, its inherent
contradictions of constitutional rights of citizens as well as the
duplicity of the same powers under it as under CrPC, most human
rights activists and legal practitioners also agree that the Act must
be recast in such a way that it meets the challenges thrown up by
these questions. In the same instance, the final decision of
redeployment must be done in consonance with the armed forces’
requirements. Former Chairperson of National Minorities Commission
Wajahat Habibullah writes the following:
This
said, it must be clearly understood that the final decision on this
must rest on the advice of the armed forces. It might be said that
the idea of redeployment has in fact originated from amongst army
officers that have served in the State, with a high sense of purpose.
If, by mutual consultation it is agreed that the law must continue,
this must then be subject to review and Rules carefully crafted for
its enforcement, which must bring the law into the fullest conformity
with the freedoms of every Indian citizen guaranteed to them by no
less than the Constitution of India (Habibullah 2012).
DEBATE
ON AFSPA
In
the history of conflict in J&K, AFSPA became controversial after
other Acts had laid a groundwork for challenging their enforcement
owing legal loopholes and human rights violations. The J&K Public
Safety Act 1978 has certain provisions that could be misinterpreted
to suit the police. According to the Act, persons acting against the
security of the state or law and order can be detained upto two
years, and without charges for upto one year. The Act was further
amended to exempt information about the arrest to the detainee. This
has been commented upon by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
for its ‘highly discretionary tone’. Similarly, the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 (TADA) has found itself
being challenged due to the very definition of disruptive activities
which could be against the constitutional right to freedom of speech.
AFSPA too faces a similar comment from the ICJ; the possible use of
armed forces in the ‘disturbed areas’ to suppress political
activity cannot be justified (Schoefield 2003). The points of
contention surrounding the debate on AFSPA are being analysed in the
larger context of conflict in J&K.
Commissions
for Judicial Scrutiny. In
the course of its long history, AFSPA has been subjected to judicial
scrutiny as well as reviews carried out with an aim to bring it
closer to ensuring protection of human rights. As a result the Act
has been whetted thoroughly. These committees have also suggested
means to having increased transparency while ensuring that armed
forces are not impeded in their functioning in such complex conflict
environments.
-
Justice
Reddy Committee 2005.
The committee was set up in the aftermath of the custodial death of
Manorama Devi in July 2004 in Manipur. The committee was mandated to
amend AFSPA to the extent of protection of human rights, and to
replace with a more humane act if required. After extensive study
and analyses of the problem in consultations with members of civil
society such as individuals, groups, legal fraternity and tribal
groups as also the army in the state as well at the central level,
the committee submitted its report in June 2005. It reported that
the overwhelming desire of the people was the retention of the army,
but with suitable changes in the legal mechanisms; so as to create
an environment for the operation of armed forces against militants
without harming rights of the people. In doing so, the committee
opined that the existing Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA)
1967 with some amendments could be utilised to give the armed forces
the protection they needed. The reasons given by the committee were
the fact that UAPA was designed to deal with terrorism, had defined
activities and groups involved in terrorism, has inbuilt protection
for armed forces and paramilitary, and is applicable pan-India. At
the same time accused people would be afforded protection under
section 45 of UAPA. It also suggested the setting up of grievance
cells with members from the local administration, the army and the
police.
The
Justice Reddy committee was criticised for being regressive in
nature; although advocating the repeal of AFSPA, it was recommending
special powers via the UAPA. It would be violating human rights yet
again, albeit in the guise of another law. The report contained the
guidelines of the Supreme Court which were an improvement on the Dos
and Don’ts issued by the army for insurgency operations. The same
have been attached at Appendix 2 of this research (Gonsalves 2005)
-
Justice
Hegde Commission 2013. The
commission was appointed by the Supreme Court after investigations
were sought against extrajudicial deaths in Manipur from 1978 to
2010. It was mandated to evaluate the role of the security forces in
the state; apropos the commission consulted members of civil society
publicly, collected documentary evidence and the testimony of
various members of the security forces. It reported that
investigations by the security forces were inadequate and use of
force had been more than required. It also advocated the
strengthening of the police forces which were found ill trained to
deal with insurgency in the state, in order to remove the armed
forces. It also pointed out to the disproportionate use of
ammunition while not attempting to apprehend the accused (Justice
Hegde Commission Report 30 March 2013)
The
Justice Hegde Commission has been viewed as unrealistic in the
context of insurgency operations. Such views are widely acknowledged
amongst senior officers of the armed forces. The major flaw is to
expect personnel operating in highly dangerous and life threatening
environment to be able to use non-lethal force.
-
Justice
Verma Committee 2013.
This particular report is being mentioned separately since it was
not directly pertaining to AFSPA, but has commented on it. The
government appointed Justice Verma Committee to review laws against
sexual assault, in the aftermath of the gang-rape and murder of a
girl in Delhi in December 2012iii.
The report included comments on sexual offences committed in
conflict zones. It said that sexual offences were legitimized by
means of the AFSPA. It recommended that armed forces be tried under
ordinary criminal law, and the training and monitoring of personnel
be re-oriented to deal with the issue of sexual offences (Justice
Verma Committee Report 2013).
The
Justice Verma Committee report has been criticised for misstating
facts as well as not taking cognisance of existing rules and
regulations in the armed forces which take any form of sexual assault
offences with utmost seriousness and the strictest disciplinary
action is initiated against the offender. Similarly, incorrect
factual knowledge of military deployment in insurgency operations,
insufficient and factually incorrect knowledge of speedy legal
process in the army has been criticised (Kadyan 2013).
Apart
from the judicial review cited above, the Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutional validity of the AFSPA, stating that powers given
to armed forces are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’ (Jha
2015). The same has been categorically repeated by senior hierarchy
of the army with a view towards public opinion on the issueiv.
Constitutional
Contradictions.
Certain provisions of the AFSPA have been regarded as being in direct
contradiction to constitutional rights of the people. The argument is
made that AFSPA actually violates these rights because it dilutes
the very provisions of the Constitution. As a result, a
counter-productive approach is being made to security challenges.
Some of the issues that make this part of the debate are being
analysed here with both sides of the argument in focus.
-
Disproportionate
Use of Force.
One of the most hotly debated points is the use of force, and the
use of force disproportionate to the offence. Detractors of AFSPA
argue that use of force has been laid down in international law as
justified by self-defence, or as a means of last resort (Srivastava
2012). However, anyone who has served in insurgency operations will
realise that the question of self-defence is itself the answer to
why use of force as per AFSPA is required. Functioning in an
environment where there is no distinction between a normal citizen
and an insurgent who will open fire at will, and with the intent of
killing as many people as possible, requires such use of force. If
this power is reduced, troops would not be safe to step out on
patrolling duties or for cordon and search operations.
-
Arbitrariness
of Arrest.
Critics argue that the provisions for arrest and detention under
AFSPA overlook the due process of law including medical examination
of the accused. In itself it may make sense, but in the context of
the violence unleashed by terrorists, arrest is a bonus. It means
that the operating force would be fortunate to make an arrest rather
than be fired upon, or even worse, lose its personnel under hostile
fire. Further, to counter arbitrariness the Act has, within its
provisions, the additional clause that the arrested person needs to
be handed over to the police. Also, no interrogation is allowed
after the arrest; the onus of satisfying itself of the validity of
the arrest is before the arrest for the forces. These safeguards
ensure that no arbitrariness is exhibited in arresting or detaining
anybody. The Supreme Court has also upheld the provisions of the
AFSPA based on a realistic look at the ground situation during such
operationsv.
-
Immunity
Afforded against Prosecution.
The argument against the immunity clause of AFSPA is that since no
prosecution is possible without prior central government sanction,
no prosecution takes place. Victims therefore have no remedy with
either the sanction not coming through or just being used as an
excuse to overlook excess on the part of the armed forces
(Srivastava 2012). To this the response of the armed forces is that
the provisions relate to frivolous charges which are natural in
conflict areas such as J&K and which tie up the armed forces
from doing their actual tasks. The second response pertains to the
existing mechanism for prosecuting offenders under the Army Act. In
fact, prosecution is much faster and efficient under the provisions
of the Army Act. It is however also a fact that such cases are kept
low profile with no undue publicity (Kadyan 2013). Further Court
Martial proceedings are based on rule of law, with the army itself
keen that offenders get punished to maintain the discipline required
of a fighting force.
While
the concerns voiced by various interest groups about excessive powers
given under the provisions of AFSPA are correct in terms of the
legal, constitutional and rights based arguments, it remains equally
pertinent that armed forces working under such adverse circumstances
need the protection they can be given. This has a direct bearing on
troops’ functioning and morale. In the absence of such safeguards,
troops would suffer unnecessary casualties; it is akin to fighting
with one arm tied behind the back. It is also in the interest of the
armed forces that any cases of excessive or undue force, or of
criminal offences such as sexual assault or rape be dealt with
promptly under the law. Finally it becomes obvious that continuous
efforts be made to educate officers and troops about the law, as well
as a humane approach in such conflict zones. In the zeal to perform
their given tasks, they must never overlook the fact that there are
ordinary people also involved.
Emergency
vs Human Rights.
Established principles of human rights are usually sidelined in the
violence of armed conflicts such as J&K. Peace becomes a term
difficult to comprehend, especially in the vocabulary of violent
strife which overcomes basic human decency and rule of law. The
mechanisms of governance are used to bring semblance of order. It is
this act of the government that initiates such requirements as
declaring an emergency and bringing the region under the gambit of
‘disturbed areas’. Where then do human rights figure in this
discussion?
Critics
of AFSPA argue that in international law, even during such violence
in conflict zones, the rights to life and liberty remain paramount.
Emergency laws too need to be utilised with certain inbuilt
safeguards to ensure that they do not end up being despotic or
dictatorial in nature. The other focus of international law is that
the non-state actors would also have some manner of organised
structure, firstly to be able to create conditions of conflict, and
secondly to be able to pursue their aims. In the case of J&K,
this structure emanates from Pakistan using its proxy apparatus.
Lastly, the protections afforded in such laws as AFSPA need to be
viewed in light of the military necessity of deploying forces (Ahmed
2012).
If
AFSPA indeed creates conditions for the violation of basic human
rights and rights enshrined in the Constitution, then the onus of
rescinding such laws lies with the government. As is evident from the
judicial reviews, the law recognises the requirement of such a law in
disturbed areas. But the argument against the retention of such laws
has given impetus to the thought process that these will invariably
bring an erosion to civil liberties. In the long run, these will
prove detrimental to any peace process.
View
Point of Armed Forces.
If the armed forces are the to be part of any consultative mechanism
in deciding the future of AFSPA, then their views bear weight
(Habibullah 2012). The senior hierarchy of the armed forces have
stressed upon the requirements of the intrinsic safeguards of AFSPA
in operating under duress in insurgency or internal security. Yet
they also agree that the final call on restoring the rule of law in
conflict zones lies with the government inasmuch as devising means to
garner confidence in the people. It is the sheer compulsion of having
run out of options that the armed forces have been called in. In that
case why grudge the armed forces certain protection? In its defence
the army reiterates that it accords the highest priority to upholding
human rights, avoiding collateral damage and maintaining high moral
standards (Jha 2015). Since 1994, 1517 cases of violations have been
reported with only 54 found to be true. 38 Officers, 12 Junior
Commissioned Officers and 79 soldiers have been punished, with
punishments ranging from life imprisonment to dismissal from service.
CONCLUSION
Various
interest groups have alleged the violation of human rights,
constitutional rights to life and liberty, and heinous crimes which
fall in the category of war crimes. All these allegations stem from
the powers given to armed forces under provisions of Armed Forces
Special Powes Act. On the one hand, insufficient research has gone
into establishing links between some or all these groups and the
insurgents or their proxy partners in Pakistan. Without empirical
evidence, it remains a conjecture, but worth investigation. Similar
investigation is required into Indian researchers being funded by
overseas organisations to critique AFSPA. On the other hand, it is
pertinent to understand that deployment of armed forces without
protective mechanisms amounts to making them fight with one arm tied
behind their backs; virtual cannon fodder. Hence the requirement of
AFSPA is beyond reasonable doubt. The same has been upheld by the
Supreme Court in terms of its constitutional validity. In the same
breath, all possible avenues must be explored to amend the provisions
of AFSPA in order to make it more humane in nature. The system of
military justice also needs to be further strengthened. Finally for
the man on the ground, strict rules of engagement must be laid down
with no room for any deviation; if deviation happens, a speedy
justice system must bring the deviant to book. The Armed Forces
Special Powers Act has been examined as part of the narrative of
conflict in J&K. In doing so, this research has relied on primary
and secondary sources for its historical correctness and certain
specific survey based interviews to ascertain opinions and
viewpoints.
APPENDIX
1: ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT 1990
ARMED
FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1990
The
Gazette of India EXTRAORDINARY
PART II-Section 1
PUBLISHED
BY AUTHORITY
NEW DELHI, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1990/
BHADRA
20, 1912
MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE
(Legislative
Department)
New Delhi, the 11th September, 1990/Bhadra 20, 1912
(Saka)
The
following Act of Parliament received the assent of the President on
the 10th September 1990, and is hereby published for general
information:
THE
ARMED FORCES (JAMMU AND KASHMIR) SPECIAL POWERS ACT, 1990
No. 21
of 1990
[10th
September, 1990.]
An
Act to enable certain special powers to be conferred upon members of
the armed forces in the disturbed areas in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.
BE
it enacted by Parliament in the Forty-first Year of the Republic of
India as follows:
1.
Short title, extent and commencement. (1)
This Act may be called the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act, 1990.
(2)
It extends to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3)
It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 5th day of July,
1990.
2.
Definitions. In
this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
-
(a)
“armedforces”meansthemilitaryforcesandtheairforces operating as
land forces and includes any other armed forces of the Union so
operating
-
(b)
“disturbedarea”meansanareawhichisforthetimebeing declared by
notification under section 3 to be a disturbed area;
-
(c)
all other words and expressions ‘used herein, but not defined and
defined in the Air Force Act, 1950,1 or the Army Act, 1950,2 shall
have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts.
3.
Power to declare areas to be disturbed areas. If,
in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Governor of that
State or the Central Government, is of opinion that the whole or any
part of the State is in such a disturbed and dangerous condition that
the use of armed forces in aid of the civil power is necessary to
prevent—
-
(a)
activities involving terrorist acts directed towards overawing the
Government as by law established or striking terror in the people or
any section of the people or alienating any section of the people or
adversely affecting the harmony amongst different sections of the
people;
-
(b)
activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about
cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part
of the territory of India front the Union or causing insult to the
Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the
Constitution of India, the Governor of the State or the Central
Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare
the whole or any part of the State to be a disturbed area.
Explanation.—In
this section, “terrorist act” has the same meaning as in
Explanation to article 248 of the Constitution of India as applicable
to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
4.
Special powers of the armed forces. Any
commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or
any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a
disturbed area,—
-
(a)
if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the
maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may
consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the
causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention
of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed
area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the
carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or
of firearms, ammunition or explosive substances;
-
(b)
if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms
dump, prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed
attacks are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to be
made, or any structure used as training camp for armed volunteers or
utilized as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any
offence;
-
(c)
arrest, without warrant, any persons who has committed a cognizable
offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has
committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use
such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest;
-
(d)
enter and search,without warrant, any premises to make any such
arrest as aforesaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongful
restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to be
stolen property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances
believed to be unlawful kept in such premises, and may for that
purpose use such force as may be necessary, and seize any such
property, arms, ammunition or explosive substances;
-
(e)
stop, search and seize any vehicle or vessel reasonably suspected to
be carrying any person who is a proclaimed offender, or any persons
who has committed a non- cognizable offence, or against whom a
reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to
commit a non- cognizable offence, or any person who is carrying any
arms, ammunition or explosive substance believed to be unlawfully
held by him, and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be
necessary to effect such stoppage, search or seizure, as the case
may be.
5.
Power of search to include powers to break open locks, etc.
Every
person making a search under this Act shall have the power to break
open the lock of any door, almirah, safe, box, cupboard, drawer,
package or other thing, if the key thereof is withheld.
6.
Arrested persons and seized property to be made over to the police.
Any
person arrested and taken into custody under this Act and every
property, arms, ammunition or explosive substance or any vehicle or
vessel seized under this Act, shall be made over to the
officer-incharge of the nearest police station with the least
possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances
occasioning the arrest, or as the case may be, occasioning the
seizure of such property, arms, ammunition or explosive substance or
any vehicle or vessel, as the case may be.
7.
Protection of persons acting in good faith under this Act.
No
prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted,
except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against
any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in
exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.
8.
Repeal and saving. (1)
The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Ordinance, 1990,3
is hereby repealed.
(2)
Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under
the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under
the corresponding provisions of this Act.
V.S.
RAMA DEVI, Secy. to the Govt. of India
CORRIGENDA
In
the Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1990 as published in
the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, dated the
7th June, 1990 (Issue No.32),—
At
page 1, in second line from the bottom, for “Regulation, 1963
(Andhra Pradesh Regulation 2 of” read “Regulation, 1970 (Andhra
Pradesh Regulation 1 of”.
At
page 2, in line 7, for “(Bihar Act 8 of 1985)” reads “(Bihar
Act 8 of 1885)”.
______
EXTRAORDINARY
THE
JAMMU
& KASHMIR GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
Vol. 103] Srinagar, Fri., the
6th July, 90/15th Asa., 1912. [No.14-1 PART I-B
Jammu and
Kashmir Government—Notifications.
..........
GOVERNMENT
OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,
CIVIL SECRETARIAT—HOME DEPARTMENT.
SRO
NO. SW 4 Dated 6-7, 1990
In
exercise of the powers conferred under section 3 of the Armed Forces
(Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Ordinance, 1990, the Governor of
Jammu and Kashmir hereby notifies the areas given in the Schedule to
this notification as Disturbed Areas.
(Sd.)............................. Additional Chief
Secretary (Home),
Jammu and Kashmir Government.
...............................
SCHEDULE
1.
Areas falling within 20 Kms. of the Line of Control in the Districts
of Rajouri and Poonch.
2.
Districts of Anangtnag, Baramulla, Badgam, Kupwara, Pulwama and
Srinagar.
(Sd.)............................
Additional Chief Secretary (Home),
Jammu and Kashmir Government.
Government
of Jammu and Kashmir
Civil
Secretariat Home Department
NOTIFICATION
SRINAGAR,
THE 10TH AUSUGT, 2001
SRO
351: Whereas the Governor is of the opinion that the State is in such
a disturbed condition that the use of Armed Forces in the aid of
civil power is necessary to prevent the activities involving
terrorists acts directed towards striking terror in the people;
Now,
therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the
Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, the
Governor hereby declares the districts of Jammu, Kathu, Udhampur,
Poonch, Rajouri and Doda to be disturbed areas in addition to
districts, Srinagar, Budgam, Anantnag, Pulwama, Baramulla and Kupwara
which stand already so declared.
By
order of the Governor
Principal
Secretary to Government Home
Department
NO:
Home-219/97-ISA dated 10.8.2001. Copy for information to :
-
Chief
Secretary, J&K, Srinagar.
-
Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
-
Secretary,
Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
-
Joint
Secretary (K-I), MHA (Deptt. of J&K Affairs), New Delhi.
-
Principal
Secretary to HE the Governor.
-
Principal
Secretary to Hon’ble Chief Minister.
-
Commr/Secretary,
Law.
-
Director
General Police, Srinagar.
-
Director
General, BSF, New Delhi.
-
Director
General, ITBP, New Delhi.
-
Director
General, CRPF, New Delhi.
-
GOC,
XVI Corps C/o 56 APO
-
GOC,
XV Corps C/o 56 APO
-
GOC,
XIV Corps C/o 56 APO
-
Divisional
Commissioner, Jammu.
-
Director
Information, J&K, Srinagar.
-
All
District Magistrates of Jammu Division.
-
All
District Superintendents of Police, Jammu Division.
-
Pvt.
Secretary to Hon’ble MOS(Home)
on
15 November 2015
APPENDIX
2: GUIDELINES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
LIST
OF DOS AND DON’TS DIRECTED BY SUPREME COURT
Dos
1.
Action before Operation
(a)
Act only in the area declared ‘Disturbed Area’ under Section 3 of
the Act.
(b)
Power to open fire using force or arrest is to be exercised under
this Act only by an officer/JCO/WO and NCO.
(c)
Before launching any raid/search, definite information about the
activity to be obtained from the local civil authorities.
(d)
As far as possible coopt representative of local civil administration
during the raid.
2.
Action during Operation
(a)
In case of necessity of opening fire and using any force against the
suspect or any person acting in contravention of law and order,
ascertain first that it is essential for maintenance of public order.
Open fire only after due warning.
(b)
Arrest only those who have committed cognizable offence or who are
about to Commit cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable
ground exists to prove that they have committed or are about to
commit cognizable offence.
(c)
Ensure that troops under command do not harass innocent people,
destroy property of the public or unnecessarily enter into the
house/dwelling of people not connected with any unlawful activities.
(d)
Ensure that women are not searched/arrested without the presence of
female police. In fact women should be searched by female police
only.
3.
Action after Operation
(a)
After arrest prepare a list of the persons so arrested.
(b)
Hand over the arrested persons to the nearest police station with
least possible delay.
(c)
While handing over to the police a report should accompany with
detailed circumstances occasioning the arrest.
(d)
Every delay in handing over the suspects to the police must be
justified and should be reasonable depending upon the place, time of
arrest and the terrain in which such person has been arrested. Least
possible delay may be 2-3 hours extendable to 24 hours or so
depending upon a particular case.
(e)
After raid make out a list of all arms, ammunition or any other
incriminating material/document taken into possession.
(f)
All such arms, ammunition, stores etc. should be handed over to the
police station along with the seizure memo.
(g)
Obtain receipt of persons and arms/ammunition, stores etc. so handed
over to the police.
(h)
Make record of the area where operation is launched having the date
and time and the persons participating in such raid.
(i)
Make a record of the commander and other officers/JCOs/ NCOs forming
part of such force.
(k)
Ensure medical relief to any person injured during the encounter, if
any person dies in the encounter his dead body be handed over
immediately to the police along with the details leading to such
death.
4.
Dealing with Civil Court
(a)
Directions of the High Court/Supreme Court should be promptly
attended to.
(b)
Whenever summoned by the courts, decorum of the court must be
maintained and proper respect paid.
(c)
Answer questions of the court politely and with dignity.
(d)
Maintain detailed record of the entire operation correctly and
explicitly.
Don’ts
-
Do
not keep a person under custody for any period longer than the bare
necessity for handing over to the nearest police station.
-
Do
not use any force after having arrested a person except when he is
trying to escape.
-
Do
not use third-degree methods to extract information or to a extract
confession or other involvement in unlawful activities.
-
After
arrest of a person by the member of the armed forces, he shall not
be interrogated by the member of the armed force.
-
Do
not release the person directly after apprehending on your own. If
any person is to be released, he must be released through civil
authorities.
-
Do
not tamper with official records.
-
The
armed forces shall not take back a person after he is handed over to
civil police.
List
of Dos and Don’ts while Providing Aid to Civil Authority Dos
-
Act
in closest possible communication with civil authorities throughout.
-
Maintain
inter-communication if possible by telephone/radio.
-
Get
the permission/requisition from the Magistrate when present.
-
Use
little force and do as little injury to person and property as may
be consistent with attainment of objective in view.
-
In
case you decide to open fire:
(a) Give warning in local
language that fire will be effective; (b) Attract attention before
firing by bugle or other means;
(b)
Attract attention before firing by bugle or other means;
(c)
Distribute your men in fire units with specified Commanders;
(d)
Control fire by issuing personal orders;
(e)
Note number of rounds fired;
(f)
Aim at the front of crowd actually rioting or inciting to riot or at
conspicuous ringleaders, i.e., do not fire into the thick of the
crowd at the back;
(g)
Aim low and shoot for effect;
(h)
Keep Light Machine Gun and Medium Gun in reserve;
(i)
Ceasefiringimmediatelyoncetheobjecthasbeenattained;
(j)
Take immediate steps to secure wounded.
6.
Maintain cordial relations with civilian authorities and paramilitary
forces.
7.
Ensure high standard of discipline.
Don’ts
-
Do
not use excessive force
-
Do
not get involved in hand-to-hand struggle with the mob
-
Do
not ill-treat anyone, in particular, women and children
-
No
harassment of civilians
-
No
torture
-
No
communal bias while dealing with civilians
-
No
meddling in civilian administration affairs
-
No
Military disgrace by loss/surrender of weapons
-
Do
not accept presents, donations and rewards
on
15 November 2015
REFERENCES/
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmed,
Ali. 2012. ‘AFSPA
in Light of Humanitarian Law’ in Chadha, Vivek (ed.) Armed
Forces Special Powers Act: The Debate.
New Delhi: Lancer Books with Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA).
Das,
Pushpita. 2012. ‘The History of Armed Forces Special Powers Act’
in Chadha, Vivek (ed.) Armed
Forces Special Powers Act: The Debate.
New Delhi: Lancer Books with Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA).
Habibullah,
Wajahat. 2012. ‘Armed Forces Special Powers Act, Jammu and Kashmir’
in Chadha, Vivek (ed.) Armed
Forces Special Powers Act: The Debate.
New Delhi: Lancer Books with Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA).
Jha,
UC. 2015. Armed
Forces Special Powers Act: A Draconian Law?
Delhi: Vij Books Pvt Ltd.
Kadyan,
Raj. 2013. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act- Need for Review? New
Delhi: United Service Institution of India, Journal of the United
Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLII, No. 591, January-March
2013.
Srivastava,
Devyani. 2012. ‘Rights-Based
Critique of AFSPA’ in Chadha, Vivek (ed.) Armed
Forces Special Powers Act: The Debate.
New Delhi: Lancer Books with Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA).
i
The text of the
Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1990 has been attached at Appendix
1. The Guidelines of the Supreme Court of India in the form of Dos
and Don’ts have been listed out in Appendix 2.
ii
The ruling has
been given in the case of Indrajit Barua vs State of Assam, 1983.
iii
The gang-rape
and brutal attempt to murder a girl in Delhi on 16 December 2012 is
known as the Nirbhaya Case. The name Nirbhaya was given to protect
the girl’s identity from public, but was found and made public by
some sections of the media. The girl died subsequently due to
extensive injuries sustained during the rape and violent physical
assault by the rapists. All the rapists have been given the death
penalty, and the same has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Though
the Justice Verma Committee was not mandated as such, it has
commented on the issue of sexual offences in conflict zones.
iv
For instance,
General VK Singh,
Former Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army, and currently Member of
Parliament from the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party, in an interview
with Frank Pereira on 'To The Point', talk show on Rajya Sabha
Television, 15 January 2015.
v
The
Constitutional validity of AFSPA has been challenged in the Naga
People’s Movement of Human Rights vs Union of India
case in 1997. The Supreme Court has upheld the Constitutional
validity of the Act, ruling that the powers given to the army are
not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’, or violative of the
provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Arrests
pertaining to women need to follow the same procedure as laid down
in the Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 47(2), 51(2), 100(3) and
160(1). On the issue of declaring an area disturbed, the Court ruled
for a review every six months. If the Government of India does not
give sanction for prosecution in any particular case, it has to
justify the refusal of sanction. The same is subject to judicial
scrutiny.