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ABSTRACT
Jammu
and Kashmir is dubiously distinguished as one of the most violent
prone conflict zones in the world. What is the Evidence of this
violence? This conflict has been examined through the lens of
narratives from the hinterland. What is the relation of violence with
state and non-state actors? Are extant ethnic divides constructively
or destructively oriented? Using this history and evidence of
violence, the paper seeks to delve into questions which must
necessarily form the backbone of any meaningful resolution mechanism.
Analyses have been based on examination of cases from conflict
afflicted areas, historical contextualization of arguments, and
debates from primary and secondary sources.
KEYWORDS
Jammu
& Kashmir, Politics, Conflict, Violence, Analyses, Inequality
DEFINITION
OF VIOLENCE
How
does one define violence? The World Health Organization defines
Violence as "the intentional use of power or physical force,
threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a
group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood
of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or
deprivation", but acknowledges that the inclusion of "the
use of power" in its definition expands on the conventional
meaning of the word (World Health Organization 2002). Spanning the
entire spectrum, violence in conflict ranges from that inflicted by
adversaries, whether state or non-state actors, and also ranges the
entire gamut of ethnic, religious or gender based 'direct' violence
or economic, political or culture based 'indirect' violence.
In
response to widespread threats and targeted attacks and killings by
militant groups, many Hindus had fled. Jagmohan's government
ultimately assisted some 90000 Hindus in leaving the Kashmir valley
for camps in Jammu and New Delhi….security forces opened fire
repeatedly on unarmed protestors….constituted a serious violation
of international humanitarian lawi.
THE STATE AND VIOLENCE
What
is the relation of the state with violence in a conflict zone? Extant
studies have attributed it to certain factors which are being
discussed here. It may be (a)
the
kind of regime that dictates the violence.
The reasoning goes that democracies encourage dissent and therefore
collective action, but totalitarian or tyrannical regimes stifle
these. It is therefore in certain 'anocracies', which would be the
grey area between a democracy and an authoritarian regime, semi-
democratic so to speak, that the use of violence would be most
rampant. Alternately, it may not be the kind of regime, but (b)
specifically
its use of repression.
This may therefore, be the reason for violence at various levels of
repression. Yet another theory denotes it to (c)
the
quality of rule that the state is able to provide its citizenry.
To quote (Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010):
States
with a ruling elite that has historically dominated particular ethnic
groups or classes may invite violent uprisings….States themselves
may initiate civil violence when it is in their interest to do
so….state policies toward ethnic groups depend upon the
international environment…. Studies point to the need to consider
the nature of the state and the quality of its rule as a variable,
rather than a fixed state characteristic. Changes in state behaviour,
rather than particular classes of states, may better explain episodes
of political violence.
Where
does the conflict in J&K define itself? To my mind, our study
fits itself as a mix of the second and third theories. Since India as
a whole cannot be categorized as an anocracy, one must look at the
microcosm of J&K, where the state definitely shows signs of being
an anocracy, characterized as it is by inherent political instability
and ineffectiveness and an incoherent mix of democratic and
autocratic traits and practices, making repression inherent to its
functioning. This, when coupled with the quality of rule that is
perceived in ibid microcosm, causes for violence to be perpetuated
(when in own interest), as also a penchant for variable policies
dependent on the larger (international?) environment.
This
lethal mix lays the basic groundwork for both insurgent violence as
well as state violence for political space and/ or agenda. A
comparison is sought to be drawn below. Yet, a few facts need to be
understood before proceeding ahead. Violence is an elementary form of
communal activity (communal as in arising from a community or group,
not communal in religious terms). It arises from a definite set of
circumstances and it affects flesh and blood victims. It creates a
number of scenarios, which may be dealt with in different ways.
Finally it has finite consequences for the conflict; the conflict may
move in a negative or positive direction, again depending on the way
the various protagonists react or view the violence. Any violence
does not target its victims at random, it is not quirky and its
victims may be representative of a larger target audience, a
messenger so to speak. To the victim and the perpetrator both,
violence is not senseless or meaningless, though usually from a
standoff point of view, this may well seem so. The perpetrator is
trying to send a message across by means of his violent acts;
similarly, the victim will understand where the warning lies. However
much it may seem like an outlier, violence is not a segregated act.
If unravelled far enough, it has its indelible connection to a cause,
and hence it is an effect.
COMPARISON OF CONFLICTS WITH
EVIDENCE OF VIOLENCE
It
is the set of proportions outlined above that make it possible to
compare violence in different conflicts and draw lessons there from.
Conflicts both in the domestic and the international sphere exist,
which are comparable to the issue of J&K. Amongst the notable and
hence, being focused upon here, striking similarities are the long
drawn counterinsurgency campaign, coupled with a high toll of human
life, death cases, disappearance cases, the strung out violence by
both the state and the non-state actors, and the political violence
attached to the conflict.
….I
visited a friend's orchards in village
Romo….off
the Pulwama- Shopian road….the commanding officer of a BSF company
stationed there who turned out to be the worst kind of advertisement
for the armed forces in Kashmir. His demeanour, even the way he
walked and the tone he used when talking to the locals, was designed
to intimidate people. With absolute confidence he told me that yes,
tough measures were used with the youth, 'even with those who are
picked up on grounds of suspicion'….he said, it was necessary
(Quraishi 2004).
The
description in this passage could well have been from a case study of
the Punjab insurgency in the 1980's, with names of places changed to
those in rural Punjab. In the backdrop of militant organizations
getting a fillip during Indira Gandhi's Prime Minister ship, and
during the Emergency days, the conflict remained nonviolent from 1978
to 1984. Though the state of Punjab saw rising episodes of communal
clashes, the government at the Centre and the hardliner separatists
did not openly profess violence towards each other. It was only in
1984, when the militants took up fortified positions inside the
Golden Temple complex in Amritsar, that a decision was taken by the
government to use the Army to flush them out, in Operation Bluestar.
The bloodbath that followed still remains in the institutional memory
of the Sikhs, and indeed, led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi
by her own Sikh bodyguards.
What
was glossed over in the build up to Operation Bluestar however was
the repeated failure of talks between the Akali Dal and the central
government, effectively discrediting the Akalis in the eyes of their
own electorate, as well as giving a boost to the secessionists under
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. It became common-speak in Punjab that the
only way out was to launch a violent agitation. The central
government, in its defence spoke of the measures it had taken to
resolve issues, sadly not realizing the futility of too little, too
lateii.
In the aftermath of Operation Bluestar, and the subsequent failure of
the much touted Rajiv Gandhi- Longowal Accord of 1985, the stand of
the secessionists became appealing to the ordinary man. It resulted
in increasing violence between 1987 and 1992. The spirals of violence
were not only between the insurgents and the police (and later on,
the Army); it was also a contest between the various militant groups
vying for supremacy on the political side of things. Escalation of
violence often meant the common man was in the gun- sights of both
sides, and eventually led to his alienation. This very alienation of
the man on the streets, was seen as central to the success of the
counterinsurgency campaign under the stewardship of Julio Rebeiro,
followed by (the infamous) KPS Gill, then Chiefs of Police in Punjab.
What
does the study of these two conflicts, namely J&K and Punjab,
both within the sovereignty of India, offer to the student of
Conflict and Violence?
First
and most conspicuous observation is the direct correlation that the
(current) political situation at the Centre has to the position it
adapts towards the state. The period of stability at the Centre
offers some indication of resolution with the partisan groups. This
is however, heavily overshadowed by the periods of uncertainty,
instability and political turmoil. It not only creates chaos at the
macro level of dialogue and efforts at reconciliation. At the micro
level, it brings forth the worst form of violence. Though the
explanation may seem rather simplistic, but invariably, the grass
root levels perceive this as a refusal to look at their genuine
grievances. Violent means are seen as the only way to make their
presence felt and their voices heard. The state, on the other hand,
does not concede its flawed outlook or its inability to resolve. It
comes down with all the might at its disposal, to deal with the
violence of the perpetrators. This effectively sets in motion a
vicious cycle of violence begetting violence, with neither side
willing to or able to extricate itself. All signs of reconciliation
and resolution disappear. In order to gain primacy for its own views,
there is a tendency to ignore the views of the other. Objectivity
is lost sight of, as a result, and violence becomes a priority.
Secondly,
inherent contestation in both sides seeking legitimacy to their
actions is evident even from the semantics involved. In the words of
Kalyvas, ‘the
term is often claimed by the vanquished in their quest for political
redemption and inclusion, and denied by the winners who seek the
permanent exclusion of the losers from the political, or even
national, realm’
(Kalyvas 2006). What is definitively discerned is the violent
redrawing of boundaries, turning the scape in to armed camps within
the same sovereign entity. This is a territorial division which acts
as a 'kernel' or a 'centrifuge' of the conflictiii.
It also serves to heighten the violence rather than calm it down.
If
human dignity is choked and abused, nothing remains. There is no
space for finer emotions. It’s been a tension ridden life for all
of us. My own brother was picked up for questioning and taken to an
interrogation centre where he was subjected to electric shocks in his
private parts….don't talk to us about love and our personal lives
(Quraishi 2004)iv.
There
abound hundreds of such stories which give serious anecdotal evidence
of the violence that ordinary people have to live with in conflict
zones. In his treatise, “On War”, Carl von Clausewitz defines war
as an
act of violence intended to compel and make the opponent submit to
and fulfil one's willv.
In a later expansion of his initial definition he qualifies his
statement by saying war is not merely a political act, but a real
political instrument (Clausewitz 1997{reprint}). In this definition
of war, the underlying reasons for civilian targeting can be
discerned. It appears almost as if ordinary people, non- combatants,
are deliberately victimized in order to drive home the military and
political message, with a resounding thump! The state selecting
deliberate targeting of civilians seems to form the strategy in a
good 20- 30% of all conflicts. Not being the stated policy, this
percentage may not be fully substantiated, yet this figure forms the
core of several studies. The accomplishment of military and/ or
political objectives may be considered strong enough a reasoning to
adopt this as a strategy. The 'collateral damage', as it is often,
and lightly, referred to is one of the worst ramifications of any
armed conflict, yet widely believed to terrorize the population in to
submission. In some ways it serves as a corroboration of the idea
that violence seems to flowing out of the relentless pace of the
conflict.
NON-STATE ACTORS AND VIOLENCE
Any
discourse is not complete without reference to unbridled violence by
Non-state actors. Here again, the desired objectives may decide the
course of action; an equitable and cooperative relationship between
adversaries would mean struggles of a nonviolent kind. Studies on
types of strikes have shown the use of nonviolent stoppage of work in
strikes where an improvement in the work culture or the interests of
workers was desired (Lammers 1969). In case of strikes where usurping
power was the main motive, violence, killing of superiors etc. has
found predominance, more like a mutinous situation. Again, this is a
testament to the inexorable nature of conflict, whether leading to
violence or not being a choice with the protagonists.
Pakistan
has been working on multiple planes to bleed Kashmir. It wants to
send the people of Kashmir to an ICU (intensive care unit) from where
they can never come out. The proxy war since the late 1980s is a
classic example of this. It has left more Kashmiris dead and maimed
than others. It has brought darkness to the lives of tens of
thousands of Kashmiris, who have lost their near and dear ones. There
is neither solace for them nor any light at the end of the tunnelvi
(Joshi 2013).
Relationships
between two people are an interconnection between the individuals,
where the two are bound by their feelings for each other. Similarly,
a conflict can be termed as a relationship between two adversaries,
where the two are seemingly in a marriage like alliance, bound by
their antagonism towards each other. Going further in this analogy,
disagreements are an integral part of any relationship, and the more
the disagreement deepens, it leads to strong words, arguments and
fights. This part of a relationship is akin to the violence erupting
between adversaries in a conflict, their antagonism for each other
reaching the point of no agreement. This is the tipping point in a
conflict, leading the perpetrators to believe in the efficacy of
violence as a means to achieve their perceived solution.
ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND VIOLENCE
In
citing various illustrations from the Kashmir issue, this study finds
a high degree of correlation between the views espoused by the
protagonists, their interdependence of antagonistic sentiment towards
each other, and the legitimacy they seek to gain or derive in the
larger context of the conflict itself. If opponents view each other
and their views as legitimate, they tend to move towards resolution.
Since India, Pakistan, and now, the people of J&K have become
increasingly unresponsive to each other’s stances; they tend to
ignore common values, norms and interests. It becomes even more
convoluted given the entire generation of Kashmiri youth who perceive
the Indian intervention in 'humiliating' terms; thus, they demonize
the Indian government, its military presence, and every instance of
past atrocity, real or imaginedvii
(Kriesberg and Dayton 2013). This extreme sentiment finds an echo
from the conflicts in Rwanda between the Hutus and Tutsi, as also
between the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats in former Yugoslavia.
Growing
up in the shadows of conflict, of guns wielded by both militants and
armed forces, we in Kashmir have witnessed many confusing narratives
that sometimes just 'happened' but which are now imprinted in our
minds, seemingly forever. Everything in 1990s Kashmir was, as I
remember it iteratively, brought to a standstill each day. Our lives
as young boys were ruled by a primary goal: to save ourselves and to
live just for one more day. While boys of our age in other parts of
the country were aiming for productive careers in the engineering,
medical and civil services and concentrating on their studies, our
lives were part of another narrative—knotted, twisted and often
grotesque – despite the shimmering beauty of the landscape we
inhabited. This personal narrative tries to explain how we as common
people in Kashmir have witnessed at least three crucial stages of
conflict dynamics. (i) Pre-militancy era – when everything was
normal and after returning from the local school, we would play with
the army men [without arms] who had camped in our village for some
social service, and were perceived as within ‘us’, not ‘them’
or the ‘other’. Kindness was at its peak and the red clouds in
the sky innocently followed folklore to mean that blood was being
spilt or any unwanted incident was occurring in some distant ‘other’
corner of the world. (ii) The militancy era – with haunting
memories which still predominate our terrified dreams of
cross-firing, crackdowns, identification parades, serving food to one
militant party followed by the raids of another militant party and
then nocturnal raids by the armed forces. Caught in the existential
paranoia, career and conflict, absolute anarchy of this era is the
strongest part of our memories, thought process and behaviour. (iii)
The post militancy era again consists of many catastrophic phases and
is dominated by the agonizing ‘manufactured’ and ‘action’
narratives (Bhat 2014).
Two
arguments related to ethnicities are offered here. Firstly, whether
inclusion or exclusion is the aim of the political class is indicated
by the policies adopted by them. Secondly, is violence to be treated
as a degree of the conflict or is it just a (different) form of
conflict. In context of the lines quoted above, these may be seen in
light of the distinct phases or stages of conflict dynamics that Dr
Bhat refers to.
If
one views the state of Czechoslovakia, formed in the aftermath of the
First World War as one of the outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference,
it serves as an example of the ethnic cleavages that form part of a
newly carved state. In Czechoslovakia the Czechs had a majority, with
the Germans forming the next biggest ethnic group, followed by the
Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians and Poles. The Germans formed the
majority of the population in the border area known as Sudetenland.
Despite such ethnic cleavages in the country, Germans were treated
with a fair degree of liberalism, irrespective of the government
being left-wing or right-wing. In fact at times it went beyond the
requirements laid by the minorities’ treaties; for example, those
Germans in possession of war bonds sold by Germany, which were now
rendered worthless, were compensated for their investment by the
Czechoslovakian government, albeit at a lower rate (Luza 1964).
Similar liberal policies were followed in education with Germans
being allowed to study in German language schools and even a German
University. Possibly, the one area where the Germans suffered was
their share in the bureaucracy, attributed to the requirement of
knowing Czech in the newly restructured Czechoslovakian bureaucracy.
Similar
examples abound in provinces of Balochistan, Sindh, East Bengal and
North West Frontier Province seen in the nascent stages of Pakistan's
formation. The ethnic cleavages existed despite the Muslim nation
theory of Jinnah, as each ethnic group had its distinct identity
which religion could never bind together. The dominant Punjabi
majority in governance and bureaucracy was further amplified by
rendering Urdu as the official language (Jaffrelot 2015). Thus, those
ethnicities which were already in minority, felt the pinch of these
policies of exclusion by the state, even leading to revolt especially
in case of the Balochs and the Bengalis.
The
examples here show the two diametrically opposite forms of policy
adopted; in case of Czechoslovakia, an inclusive policy lead to the
assimilation of the Germans in the new state, whereas Pakistan's
policy of exclusion right from its very inception lead to alienation
and subsequent turmoil. In the Indian state of J&K, the pre
militancy era has been described as ‘an age of kindness’, and
even the army as ‘within us’. It would be reasonable to say that
the state followed some manner of inclusive policies. For instance,
the government of India allowed the continued use of Kashmiri
language within the state administration. The bureaucracy too
functioned in an autonomous manner, despite a fundamental lack of
administrative skills in Sheikh Abdullah. The pre-militancy era was
in fact an age of progress, investment and growth, and indeed
acknowledged by Kashmiris as being much better off than the rule of
the Maharaja (Schoefield 2010). The genesis of Article 370 of the
Indian Constitution also lay in the protection of rights of the
Kashmiri peopleviii.
All these were ample indicators of an inclusive set of policies being
followed by the state.
From
its very inception ethnic cleavages existed in J&K, between the
people of Kashmir, vis-a-vis those of Jammu, vis-a-vis the Ladakhis
who shared their roots with the Tibetans, and even smaller and
minority communities like the Gujjars and the Bakharwals. There was
the occasional talk of a realignment or readjustment at regional
level owing to resentment of Sheikh Abdullah's centralising
tendencies, but these ethnic differences did not result in any major
political changes. Balraj Puri has written extensively on this chasm
in the state of J&K (Puri 1982). Discontent also sprang from
insecurities within these communities about the reforms that were
started by Sheikh Abdullah. These reforms were not only social but
economic in nature as well. The reforms were meant for the landless
and poor peasants, invariably Muslim, but at the receiving end were
the rich and landlord class amongst the Dogras in Jammu, and also by
default certain religious heads such as the Abbot of the Spituk
Monastery, considered as the spiritual head and sitting atop enormous
wealth of the Buddhist monasteries (Schoefield 2010). Another major
cause of resentment arose from the spectre of a plebiscite which
might be overwhelmingly pro-Pakistani in its verdict, as also the
‘prevarication
of Kashmiri leaders over accession’,
leading to suggestions of zonal plebiscites (Puri 1982). Yet these
were never allowed to deepen the existing fault lines by ethnicity.
With some manner of political manoeuvring the state continued to see
a path of general peace and progress, albeit slower than the rest of
India.
HISTORY
OF VIOLENCE
In
this distinct period of time spanning nearly 40 years which can be
called the pre-militancy era, a definite pattern of inclusive
policies emerges, despite ethnic cleavages in society. Political
differences tended to be a stronger driving force and some manner of
co-operation between groups was seen. Further, violence which was
sporadic at best was seen as a manifestation of the underlying
conflict in the society.
How
did these facets change in the militancy era? Did they give the
entire argument a violent twist? What caused a radicalization and
created a shift from differences based on political agenda towards
ethnic considerations? These are questions sought to be answered
here. Violence tends to be viewed as a degree of the underlying
conflict; it is but a continuum of the conflict itself, or simply
put, that the social movement process has reached so contentious a
point that violence is justified as the only way out. Both, extreme
grievances as well as a strong commitment to the cause would push the
conflict in the direction of violence.
Militancy
in J&K had its roots going back to the transition from Sheikh
Abdullah to his son Dr Farooq Abdullah. On the passing away of the
Sheikh in 1982, Dr Farooq Abdullah who had been inducted in to his
father's government succeeded him. In his initial years, J&K
politics saw a gamut of machinations by all parties, ranging from the
ouster of Dr Farooq Abdullah, to his replacement by GM Shah with help
from the Congress at the centre. The June 1983 elections were marred
by violence, and though Abdullah managed to return to power, shortly
thereafter in July 1984, GM Shah once again played defector, and
subsequently assumed power with Congress support. This period of
Shah's rule of a little less than two years, was characterised by
misrule in administration and an unprecedented level of communal
violence in the state. The deepening of the ethnic cleavages was
getting evident.
In
November 1986, the Rajiv- Farooq Accord was announced, ostensibly to
focus on the all-round economic development of the state and in a bid
to stem the growing secessionist voices. However, it served as a
means to do just the opposite. The 1987 elections in J&K proved
to be a watershed in the history of the politics of the state.
Wherein the opposition comprised mainly of secessionist and
fundamentalist parties under the banner of the Muslim United Front,
they canvassed on the plank of the moral subservience of the National
Conference to the Congress, having bartered away both their position
in J&K politics and the unique position enjoyed by the state, in
a bid to remain in power. This election also saw claims of widespread
rigging and election fraud, which were hitherto fore the
claim-to-fame of UP and Bihar (Nirmal and Bartaria 1996). Reports
ranged from anticipatory arrests and beatings of opposition
candidates, to booth capturing, to fudged ballot counting as well as
invalidation of votes, to curfew in areas where civil unrest was
foreseen. Irrespective of the fact that the state machinery remains
silent on this to date, the 1987 elections have been the final
attributable cause to the rise of militancy in the state of J&K.
With the National Conference losing almost overnight its credibility
which had been nurtured by the Sheikh, a vacuum was created in the
political space. As would be seen soon enough, this vacuum was filled
by the ideas of secession and fundamentalist ideologies.
Movement
of extreme ideologies from the fringes of politics to the mainstream
takes only odd incidents of this nature. It tends to lend legitimacy
to the use of extreme means. If due process of law and democracy are
followed, there is no legitimate reason for such violence to bloom.
It is the very failure of state machinery that creates an artificial
legitimacy, thereby making violence a viable alternative. Mir Abdul
Aziz had been Sheikh Abdullah's political opponent since the 1930s,
and had been forced to cross over to POK, from where he observed the
unfolding of events. In an interview, he said, “that
manipulation of the election disappointed the Kashmiris. They said
that 'we were trying to change the political framework by democratic
and peaceful methods, but we have failed in this. Therefore we should
take up the gun.' That was one of the reasons for the militancy. The
people of Kashmir got disgusted and disappointed and disillusioned”
(Schoefield
2010).
Post the 1987 elections, the space created by the loss of credibility
for the National Conference was rapidly filled by the fundamentalist
groups, secessionist ideologies and violent and unconstitutional
protests. It also got impetus by Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI). The ISI facilitated the crossing of Kashmiri
youth to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), training them in the use of
weapons, explosives, and not the least, anti-India ideology. By
around mid-1988, the first of these newly converted youth returned to
the Valley. In their wake followed violence, explosions, the
widespread use of the AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle and increasing
fundamentalist exhortations based on a new definition of Jihad
(religious war) to the Muslims of the Valley. Gradually this violence
spiralled in to a coalescence of militant groups.
In
a seemingly uncontrollable spiral of events in the decade that
followed, an entire new set of questions were set forth before the
polity, and indeed, the people, in India and in the state of J&K.
The number of militants infiltrating from Pakistan went up including
a number of foreign origin (Afghans, Yemenis etc.) militants who were
lured by promises of quick money, rape and pillage. 15th
August 1989 was observed as Black Day, followed by threatening
letters to non- Kashmiris and Hindus in the valley. The 1989 Lok
Sabha elections were boycotted with polling as low as 5%,
demonstrating the control that militant organisations were rapidly
gaining over the people. The VP Singh government formed at the Centre
appointed Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as the Home Minister; in December of
the same year, the Mufti's daughter Rubaiya was kidnapped by
militants in Srinagar, forcing the government to buckle under and
order the release of five hard core militants. Jagmohan was once
again appointed as the Governor of the state, resulting in Farooq
Abdullah resigning as a mark of protest.
In
January 1990, the government ordered the launch of paramilitary
forces; though little was gained by this massive operation, it
further served to alienate the people who turned out in a huge and
vehement protest. In February the Governor dissolved the Legislative
Assembly. While all this was instrumental in bringing governance to a
grinding halt, it was further exacerbated by the growing number of
political assassinations. Mosques started being used as platforms for
divisive propaganda, strikes and protests became the order of the
day, and the government started resorting to curfew more often. The
use of paramilitary forces was followed by the deployment of the Army
for internal security, counter- insurgency operations, rear area
security, and road opening. In time, the 1990s saw an entire grid of
deployment of armed forces, including the newly raised Rashtriya
Rifles meant specifically to augment force levels in J&K. The
decade also saw the exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley, a
widely politicised debate even till date.
This
decade of the 1990s can be acknowledged as the militancy era, as
described by Dr Bhat above. More importantly, it cast a pall over the
entire state. Where comprehensive and across the spectrum strategy
review was required, a colossal erosion in the inclusive policy
framework was seen. Rapid armament (militancy) and a crushing
response by the machinery of the state (deployment of troops)
resulted in not only a deepening of the extant ethnic cleavages;
political mishandling and increasing aversion to concurrence in any
form, further exacerbated the situation. What was earlier perceived
as only a simmering, sub-surface anger now manifested itself openly
in the form of radicalization and violence. This serves to further
substantiate and validate the point discussed above. Violence is but
a continuum of the conflict itself, a degree of the conflict itself,
a point of no viable alternative in the course of the social
conflict.
Here a
compelling argument is the significance of George Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel's theoretical construct of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis
better known as the Dialectical
method
of understanding reality. It comprises of three constructs, called
the Triad. The thesis is a rational premise. The antithesis is the
repudiation of the thesis, a rejoinder to the proposition. The
synthesis seeks to harmonize the conflict between the thesis and
antithesis by accommodating their common truths and forming a new
thesis, starting the process over. This means a conflict will likely
unravel in a rational or analytical pattern. When X counters or
denies Y, it results in a contention of issues or a state of strife.
Where Y is the state of affairs, X is its contrarian view, or even
its very renunciation; where Y is the thesis, X is the antithesis.
Their meeting will result in a synthesis, irrespective of any
arbitration. Therefore, synthesis is a connotation for the
confrontation of thesis and antithesis. What kind of synthesis it
will bring about, however, might depend on the arbitration or lack
thereof. For example, in the first scenario, the synthesis might
become an intractable conflict with a constant stalemate, as seen
between Israel and Palestine. Or for instance, in the second
scenario, the synthesis may become an intractable conflict, but not
with a constant stalemate, however, still lacking communication and
the alacrity to engage the conflict, similar to the example of Turkey
and Armenia. In the third scenario, the synthesis might unfortunately
end up being a violent act, such as murder, war, or genocide (Erol
2010). This is the closest explanation of what unfolded in J&K
during the militancy era. If the official stance of the government of
India was the thesis, its antithesis was the violent stance adopted
by the militants. It resulted in a conflict of epic proportions,
bordering on war. Sumantra
Bose has written of his experience in the Valley in the 1990's,
enumerating a vivid visual narrative. He says (Bose 2003):
When
I toured the Valley and Doda- Kishtwar district of Jammu in 1995, the
entire region resembled an armed garrison, teaming with soldiers, and
a vast prison camp for the population. Roadblocks were ubiquitous in
both towns and rural areas, and verbal abuse as well as beatings of
citizens was common at these checkpoints. Srinagar had become a
'bunker city', adorned with hundreds if not thousands of bunkers
manned by paramilitary soldiers crouching behind sandbags and wire
netting (the latter as protection against grenade attacks), their
guns peering out through firing slits….military convoys travelled
at all hours, the lead vehicle sporting a mounted machine gun. Even
remote villages existed cheek-by-jowl with Indian military
encampments.
The
government of India has justified its stance based on the large
presence of foreign militants, including Pakistani, Afghan, Lebanese,
Sudanese and Yemeni nationals. This changed the very character of the
insurgency from a Kashmiri demand for self-determination to an
Islamic fundamentalist grand state or Caliphate. It also served to
harden the government's stand since it now became an attack on the
territorial integrity of India.
The
culmination and both a turning point as well as a standoff point, of
this decade long violence, was the period between 1999- 2002. In
quick succession, events were perceived as the ominous portent of
what could be. While official India-Pakistan talks were being hailed
as the harbinger of change, infiltrators of the Pakistan army moved
in to the high altitude and equally high value targets of Kargil,
Drass, Mushkoh valley, Turtok and Chorbat La, with an aim to cut off
the road link between Leh and Srinagarix.
It led to the most serious military confrontation between the two
countries since the 1971 war. It could only be resolved with
international intervention with America, Russia and China
pressurizing both countries to maintain peace. With General Pervez
Musharraf assuming control as the Martial Law administrator, and
thereafter as President, the role of the Pakistan Army and the ISI in
the fuelling of the conflict in J&K was perceived as becoming
more overt than covert; more so, since Musharraf had planned and
executed the Kargil invasion, without referring to the elected
government. However, with the 9/11 attacks on the American mainland,
attention shifted focus on to the terror network of Al Qaeda, in
collusion with Mullah Omar's Taliban in Afghanistan. Though the
Pakistani administration declared its support to the 'war on terror',
it was largely seen as a delicate balancing act in order to continue
bleeding India while extracting the most from its partnership with
the US. Military aid of unprecedented proportions flowed in
ostensibly for the 'war on terror', but was duly diverted to arming
Pakistan (and its sponsored militants) against India (Haqqani 2013).
In 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked on 13th
December, leading to the closure of all borders, and mobilization of
the Indian Army, followed by the Pakistani Army on 29th
December and 1st
January 2002 respectively. In a yearlong deployment, with a number of
incidents seen as possible flash points to full-fledged war, and a
potential nuclear exchange, it only further eroded the probability of
any normalcy in the state of J&K. Once again international
pressure was brought to bear upon the two countries to restore peace
and normalcy in relations (Schoefield 2010). This time around, it
proved an even more onerous task, as the responsibility was now
sought to be fixed on 'national anger' by Prime Minister Vajpayee. He
stated it as such to both President Bush in the US and Prime Minister
Blair in the UK, ‘there is a national anger because Musharraf has
not translated into reality the promises he made in his 12th
January speech to stop cross- border terrorism’, referring to a
speech by the Pakistani President earlier that yearx.
Perhaps
this chain of events was responsible for the winds of change that the
sub- continent saw 2003 onwards. It started with a change in the very
hyperbole attached to Pakistan's stance towards India. Musharraf
proposed an approach with four tenets, namely the start of a dialogue
between the two countries, accepting the centrality of the J&K
issue, exclude undesirable and objectionable issues, and arrive at a
solution adequate to the cause of both countries as well as the
people of J&K. Though seen as many in J&K as a sell out by
Pakistan, it was also at least a start to the discussion of possible
alternatives. Musharraf went on to suggest a cease-fire at the UN
General Assembly, followed by a cease-fire on ground, towards the end
of the year. 2004 saw the resumption of flights between the two
countries. While meeting at the UN, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (of
the new Congress led government) and President Musharraf reaffirmed
their commitment to the peace process.
2005
witnessed the resumption of the bus service across the Line of
Control (LoC) from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad, with the promise of
opening up the Poonch- Rawalakote route in the future. India
announced seven Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). These included a
revival of bus links traditionally existing; meeting of relatives at
various points across the LoC including Uri and Poonch; development
and promotion of trade across the LoC; promotion of tourism on both
sides; cooperation in the field of forestry and environment
management on both sides; extend permissions to pilgrims to visit
shrines and temples, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh; and enhancing the
level of cultural interactions. In June, the All Party Hurriyat
Conference (APHC) met the Prime Minister of Pakistan, followed by a
meeting with the Indian Prime Minister in September. The Hurriyat had
factionalised into the 'moderates' and the 'hardliners'; invariably
this initiation of talks was done by the moderates. In October, a 7.6
Richter scale earthquake with its epicentre at Muzaffarabad shook the
entire region. In India, the areas of Uri and Baramula saw immense
destruction. It was envisaged by some as a catalyst, and
notwithstanding the efforts by India to provide aid, no meaningful
political solution emerged. In fact, in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT) members operating in the guise of Jama'at ud Dawa, provided
help and collected funds for the relief work (Mortenson 2005).
2006
started with the promise of redeployment of troops in J&K; the
Indian government carried out its redeployment of 5000 troops
indicating some improvement of the situation on ground. However
attacks in Doda and Udhampur raised tensions again perceived by many
as a precursor to the Prime Minister's visit and subsequently led to
the boycott of talks by the Hurriyat. Once again, the bogey of
terrorism put paid to the efforts at initiating peace; seven bomb
explosions in the suburban train network of Mumbai on 11th
July killed as many as 200 people and wounded another 700. The almost
instant denial by Pakistan was once again criticised widely in India,
marking it as a sign of its ill intentions towards India.
Benazir
Bhutto's return from an eight year old exile was to be the highpoint
of 2007, and the chance that perhaps a democratic process would move
things in the right direction. Things took an ugly turn when the
procession of vehicles in which she was moving was attacked by two
suicide bombers in October. Though she escaped unhurt, two months
later, a second suicide attack proved successful. Bhutto was
assassinated during an election rally in Rawalpindi on 27th
December.
The
next set of Foreign Secretary level talks were held in May 2008,
resulting in more lip service. In the following month, street level
protests broke out once again in the valley, reminiscent of the early
1990's. This time the issue was the allotment of land to the Amarnath
Shrine Board. When in July, the allotment was rescinded, it resulted
in massive protests by Hindus and blocking of the Jammu- Srinagar
highway. In retaliation, Muslim protestors marched towards the LoC,
resulting in firing by the forces and the death of the Hurriyat
leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz. Musharraf was forced out of power in
August, bringing in Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto's husband. He
proposed the opening up of trade routes and a policy of nuclear
restraint by both countries. However Pakistan refused to back off
from its stated policy of support to the separatists.
On
26th
November 2008, a group of 10 LeT trained terrorists made their way in
to India using the sea route and landing in Mumbai. They attacked
multiple locations including the Taj and Oberoi Hotels, and other
places known to be frequented by both Indians and western tourists.
The attacks highlighted the growing influence of the LeT, and its
ability to target apart from Indians, Americans and Jews, in line
with its global 'Jihad' against all infidels or non-believers. Public
opinion turned drastically away from any talk of peace and there was
growing talk of massive and military retaliation.
Meanwhile,
J&K went to polls in November and December 2008. The National
Conference formed the government in coalition with the Congress and
Omar Abdullah became the Chief Minister (his father, Farooq Abdullah
found a place in the Congress led government at the centre). The new
government was in the eye of the storm soon after, with the rape and
murder of two young women in Shopian in May 2009. In a complete
mismanagement of the event as it was, the government declared it as
death by drowning, leading to widespread protests. These got further
compounded by the report submitted by the Central Bureau of
Investigation, which upheld the theory. The case has been left with a
huge question mark on whether justice was served or notxi.
ANALYSES
OF VIOLENCE
This
entire post militancy era, as described by Dr Bhat above, was
“dominated by agonizing 'manufactured' and 'action' narratives”.
An evaluation of these narratives leads one to the evidence of
violence, perpetuated by an almost generational shift in the level of
involvement, and the sporadicity of the separatist demand. The
conflict saw the ouster of original protagonists, the generation
which saw the movement against the misrule of Maharaja Hari Singh and
partition of sub-continental India. These comprised of the Muslim
Conference and its pro- Pakistan stance on the one hand, and the
secular and mostly pro- India National Conference. Evidence of
violence was intermittent at best with no set patterns or regularity
for a separatist agenda. The first generational shift was seen with
the generation coming in to awareness around (both before and after)
the 1965 Indo- Pak war. The advent of martial law in Pakistan eroded
the support for accession to Pakistan; it was obviously detrimental
to any right to self-determination that the Kashmiris aspired to!
This has also been the view of the intelligentsia in popular
discourse in Pakistan (Mahapatra and Shekhawat 2007). Therefore, this
generation of Kashmiris did not believe either in the veracity of
Pakistan's claims, or in the realization of any meaningful gains by
violent means. Briefly, there was a spike during the Hair of Prophet
crisis in 1963, but it can be judged more an aberration than the
rule.
The
second generational shift was seen during the late 1980's and early
1990's. By now, Indian policies had contributed so much to the churn
of sentiment, that an inevitable intensity built up to the events of
that decade. Violence was extremely evident as has been analysed
above. The separatist demand also got the impetus that might have
been nipped in the bud. Had the Indian political climate been more
conducive, with sufficient interest given to the development of J&K,
things may have taken an entirely different turn. Had the harshness
of Indian actions been watered down, it may have resulted in a
drastically divergent scenario. Even during the height of the crisis
as it unfolded, some proactive and disparate thought infusion would
probably have seen calmer times.
The
third generational shift has ensued in the last decade. This is the
generation of Kashmiris who have grown up amidst fear, gunfire,
helplessness and tremendous indignity. They are susceptible to
narratives which have no relation to their lives or which are simply
impossible for them to connect with; hence, they are impressionable
and vulnerable, open to any thought that incites the violent streak
in them, makes them want to lash out at the establishment, and makes
them prone to divisive politics and the call for a movement! They may
not connect with the fires in Muslim areas (in the late 1960's), but
today's clarion call against the Kashmiri Pandits will resonate with
them, irrespective of the relevance of that
debate. They may not associate with the Maharaja's times and the
improvements thence, but they will and do relate to the fact of being
educated but unemployed or underemployed. It results in all fingers
pointing at the state in being unable to meet their aspirations. In
to this cauldron of high headed emotions, any spark is enough to
create an inferno. Therefore, there is evidence of violence
invariably culminating in a separatist agenda; the motives and the
motivation may be questionable, but exist it does.
CONCLUSION
In
concluding the debate on evidence of violence in conflict, this
evaluative analysis seeks to emphasize on a fusion of state
repression and the character and quality of rule that any state (and
hence the government) is able to afford its citizenry. Individual
events may not have the kind of impact that continuous policy (and
its implementation) has. It is the lack of or non-performance of
institutions that germinate extremist, militant and terrorist
movements. 'Terrorism
and other nihilistic movements grow in societies with tyrannical
governments'xii.
We would be a wiser society if we remember this.
This
analysis also provides the keys to resolution mechanisms, giving a
stark insight into peace challenged by unbridled violence in
conflict. Theoretical constructs provide us only with the foundation
for reconciliation and resolution; in the end we need paradigm
reconstruction of state legitimacy to give us that ever elusive
peace.
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i Kashmir
and International Law: How War Crimes Fuel the Conflict,
available at: http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-kashmir.html
. Accessed on 10 February 2013.
ii
The Government of India established the Sarkaria Commission on
Centre-State relations, with a mandate to recommend changes to the
structure of balance of power between centre and states within the
ambit of the Constitution of India. The Commission was established
in 1983 under Justice RS Sarkaria, a retired Supreme Court judge. It
submitted its report in 1988 in the form of a White Paper extending
to 1600 pages, with detailed recommendations on all aspects of
centre-state relations. To what extent the government took upon
itself seriously, the task of implementation is evident from the
fact that even in 2005, it was partially implemented/ at “some
stages” of implementation.
iii The
idea of territorial ambitions becoming the kernel or centrifuge of
the conflict has been written by the authors in a separate paper
analysing conflict.
iv Dr
Noor Mohammad Bilal, as quoted by Humra Quraishi.
v Carl
von Clausewitz, German General Officer, who served in the Prussian
and Russian armies, in the era of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe,
lived from 1780- 1831. His writings comprised his observations and
personal experiences during the time. After his death, his wife
edited his works and these were subsequently published. These remain
one of the foremost works on war and military strategy, even though
they were written in times of tactics and technology which were
rendered obsolete soon after his death. His treatise On
War
is considered as one of the most comprehensive theory on military
practices till date.
vi Arun
Joshi, ‘Where is strife torn J&K headed?’ in On
The Frontline,
The Tribune, Bathinda Edition, 30 September 2013.
vii Kriesberg
and Dayton have attributed the continuing and persistent enmity to
this factor of past 'humiliation', which gives impetus to
increasingly dehumanized modes of conflict. In the context of this
study, the situation in J&K has reached such proportions,
providing the opportunity for mobilizing of such sentiments.
viii The
vexatious Article 370 has increasingly gained traction as being
responsible for growing inequality and fuelling conflict in J&K.
The authors have written on the debate surrounding the revocation of
Article 370 in a separate paper titled ‘Jammu and Kashmir &
the Politics of Article 370: Seeking Legality for the Illegitimate’.
The same can be accessed at
http://grdspublishing.org/index.php/people/article/view/474
.
ix The
author of this paper was deployed in these high altitude operations
in 1999, called Operation Vijay.
x Statement
by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India, to Prime Minister
Tony Blair, as reported in The
Nation,
London Edition, 6th
June 2002.
xi Fact
Finding Report By The Independent Women's Initiative for Justice,
11th
December, 2009, available at: www.countercurrents.org
.Accessed on 20 September 2015.
